Abstract-This paper analyzes the ownership dynamics of stocks and mutual funds, using representative household panel data, the Dutch CentER Savings Survey 1993-1998. A bivariate dynamic binary-choice model is introduced, allowing for interactions between the two types of assets. We find that unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence play a large role for both types of assets. The positive relation between ownership of one type in one period and the other type in the next period is explained by correlated unobserved heterogeneity. A negative statedependence effect of lagged ownership of stocks on ownership of mutual funds is found, which can be explained by the costs of shifting funds across the two forms of stockholding.
I. Introduction
I N many industrialized countries, including the Netherlands, the percentage of private households that own some type of risky financial assets increased substantially during the nineties. In the United States, for example, the fraction of households owning some risky financial assets increased from 31.9% in 1989 to 49.2% in 1998. In Italy, the ownership rate increased from 12.0% to 22.1% in the same time period. 1 Similar trends exist in many other countries. To quote The Economist of March 2001: "Wider share ownership is profoundly important." It spreads wealth, changes attitudes to economic freedom and lowering business taxes, and leads to greater shareholder activism. This puts pressure on managers to improve their performance and promises to raise productivity and economic growth. Household stock ownership becomes more and more important, with all kinds of implications for financial markets and macro-economic policy. According to the Financial Times of August 30, 2000, the wider share ownership has reversed public opinion on the U.S. Federal Reserve's cutting interest rates: while in the past, the majority of the public would be concerned about lower returns to their savings accounts, most households will now applaud an interest rate cut because it increases the expected returns to their shares portfolio. On the other hand, the same Financial Times article states, referring to the group of retail investors in risky assets, that "one problem for policy makers analyzing this growing group of Americans is that useful data on the identity of the average investor is hard to come by." This illustrates the need for empirical work on portfolio choice at the level of the individual households. Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2002) provide an overview of the current state of the art in this field. This volume links portfolio choice theory to empirical research and contains empirical studies for several countries. Many countries have some survey data on ownership and amounts invested for several types of assets, but these data are often limited to one or more cross sections. Though useful for many purposes, such data are insufficient to analyze the dynamics of portfolio choice behavior. This requires panel data. Household panels with information on portfolio composition are currently available for the United States, Italy, and the Netherlands. Studies that look at ownership dynamics are rare. Alessie, Hochguertel, and van Soest (2002) present some univariate results for risky financial assets and employer-sponsored saving plans, using six annual waves of Dutch data. Ioannides (1992) uses two waves of the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances to study ownership and portfolio share dynamics of many types of assets including stocks. Both studies find an important effect of lagged ownership on current ownership of the same asset.
According to most models of portfolio choice, all agents hold risk-free financial assets, and this is also what is typically seen in the survey data. We therefore focus on risky financial assets. Existing empirical studies typically consider broadly defined asset groups, with all risky financial assets as one category. Important differences between various risky financial assets, however, will not be revealed in an analysis at this high level of aggregation. Although it is infeasible to use survey data to analyze ownership of every single financial product in the market, it seems worthwhile to distinguish a few subcategories of risky financial assets and to investigate the dynamics in the ownership patterns of these categories as well as the interactions between these patterns.
In particular, we think it is useful to consider the two largest categories, individual stocks and mutual funds. The theoretical argument for treating these separately is the dramatic difference in the degree of riskiness and possibly in costs and information intensiveness, as in King and Leape (1987) . At least in theory, a well-diversified mutual fund should be placed on the efficient frontier and provide a certain expected return at minimum risk. Mutual funds thus seem very attractive for the small, nonexpert investor who wants to invest a limited amount with low transaction costs. Investment in individual stocks is much riskier, but can be motivated on the basis of private, subjective distributions of future returns or hedging against individual income risk.
Moreover, because transaction costs for stocks will be less than proportional to the amounts held, holding individual stocks may be more attractive for large investors. Portfolio heterogeneity then arises because of differences in observable (for example, tax rate, socioeconomic characteristics) and unobservable (for example, risk attitude, beliefs about distribution of asset returns) investor characteristics. An empirical argument for distinguishing between the two types of risky assets is that in many countries, including the Netherlands, the mutual funds market has grown more than the market for individual stocks.
In this paper, we use dynamic binary-choice panel data models to explain the dynamics of the ownership structure of asset portfolios. The existing dynamic random-effects probit model for panel data is extended to the bivariate case, allowing for interactions between two types of assets. One of the main features of the univariate dynamic binary-choice model with random effects is that it can distinguish between unobserved heterogeneity and genuine state dependence. In addition, the bivariate model can explain the correlation between ownership of one type of asset and lagged ownership of the other type of asset, both from correlated unobserved heterogeneity and from state dependence across assets. The correlation between random effects in the ownership equations captures correlated unobserved heterogeneity. Dummies for lagged ownership of each asset type in each equation capture genuine state dependence effects. To investigate the sensitivity of the results for the randomeffects assumption, we also compare our model with a fixed-effects dynamic linear probability model.
The empirical analysis considers ownership of stocks and mutual funds, using the 1993-1998 waves of the CentER Savings panel survey of Dutch households. This is one of the few existing household panel surveys with detailed information on ownership of many types of assets and debts. The sample consists of a subsample designed to be representative for the Dutch population, and a (smaller) subsample from the highest income decile. Since ownership of risky assets is much more common among the rich than among others, this makes the data particularly useful for our purposes. The estimation sample is an unbalanced panel with 2,861 households, which, on average, participate in 3.4 waves.
Our aim is to increase insight in how households adjust the structure of their asset portfolios, addressing questions such as the following: Who are the people who have invested in mutual funds or stocks? Do background variables such as income, age, education level, and labor market status affect ownership rates of the two types of assets in the same way? Can changes in these background variables explain the increasing trends in the ownership rates? Why has the ownership rate of individual stocks increased less than the ownership rate of mutual funds? Have most new investors gone into mutual funds, or have people replaced individual stocks with mutual funds? If people hold mutual funds to diversify their risk, there seems no reason to hold individual stocks in addition. Still, the raw data show a positive correlation between ownership of mutual funds and ownership of individual stocks. Is this spurious correlation, or is there genuine state dependence across asset types, which could, for instance, be due to learning effects? Or is it because the new mutual funds owners simply keep their individual stocks?
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the dynamic bivariate probit model is presented. The data are described in section III. Section IV contains estimation results for the probit model and a brief comparison with the results of a fixed-effects linear probability model. Section V concludes.
II. A Bivariate Dynamic Random-Effects Probit Model
In this section we introduce a multivariate discrete-choice model for panel data, to explain ownership of different types of assets. For the sake of notational convenience, we present the bivariate case, but the generalization to the case of more than two asset types is straightforward. This model explicitly incorporates the binary nature of the dependent variables and produces predicted ownership probabilities between 0 and 1. It relies on individual effects being uncorrelated with regressors. Because this assumption is hard to relax in the current framework, we will, following Hyslop (1999) , compare the results with those of a fixedeffects linear probability model (LPM). The LPM has the potential drawback that predicted ownership probabilities may be outside the 0-1 interval. 2 Since the model will be applied to ownership of stocks and mutual funds, asset type 1 is referred to as stocks and asset type 2 as mutual funds. The following notation is used, where the index for the household is suppressed. y jt dependent variables: ownership dummies for stocks ( y 1t ϭ 1 if the household owns stocks in year t, y 1t ϭ 0 otherwise) and mutual funds ( y 2t ϭ 1 if the household owns mutual funds in year t, y 2t ϭ 0 otherwise); t ϭ 1, . . . , T. x t vector of independent variables, assumed to be strictly exogenous. The same independent variables are used in the two ownership equations. ␣ j random individual effects ( j ϭ 1, 2); (␣ 1 , ␣ 2 ) is assumed to be bivariate normal with variances ␣ 1 2 and ␣ 2 2 and covariance ␣ 1 ␣ 2 ␣ . u jt error terms ( j ϭ 1, 2; t ϭ 1, . . . , T); (u 1t , u 2t ) are assumed to be independent over time and bivariate standard normal with covariance .
We assume that (␣ 1 , ␣ 2 ), {u jt ; j ϭ 1, 2; t ϭ 1, . . . , T}, and {x t ; t ϭ 1, . . ., T} are independent (implying that x t is strictly exogenous).
The following specification will be used:
Some special cases are worth mentioning. If ␥ 12 ϭ 0, the equation (1) for stocks does not contain the lagged mutual funds ownership dummy. In that case, the parameters ␤ 1 , ␥ 11 , and ␣ 1 2 can be estimated consistently by considering only equation (1). This would be the standard univariate panel data probit model with state dependence ( y 1,tϪ1 is included) as well as unobserved heterogeneity (the random effect ␣ 1 ). See Heckman (1981a) for a discussion of this model. Similarly, the equation (2) for mutual funds can be estimated as a univariate model if ␥ 21 ϭ 0.
If y 2,tϪ1 enters the first equation but error terms and random effects in the first equation are independent of error terms and random effects in the second equation, then y 2,tϪ1 is weakly exogenous in the equation for y 1t . In this case the first equation could be treated as a univariate model with (weakly) exogenous regressors only.
One of the main advantages of dynamic random-effects models is their ability to distinguish between unobserved heterogeneity (random effects) and state dependence (the lagged dependent variable). Both phenomena can explain why ownership of stocks in period t is positively correlated with ownership of stocks in period t ϩ 1 (conditional on observed background variables x t and x tϩ1 ). The bivariate extension can in addition address spillover effects from one asset type to the other. If ownership of stocks in period t ϩ 1 is correlated to ownership of mutual funds in period t, this can be due to correlated unobserved heterogeneity (that is, a nonzero covariance between ␣ 1 and ␣ 2 ) or due to state dependence across asset types (that is, a nonzero value of ␥ 12 ). This distinction is important for understanding the dynamics of the asset ownership decisions. For example, a positive value of ␥ 12 could mean that mutual funds-which are easily accessible and advertised on a large scale-may have a learning effect in the sense that their acquisition changes people's attitudes to holding risky assets in general. People may then be induced to start buying individual stocks. On the other hand, a positive correlation between the random effects would simply mean that the same people who find it attractive to hold stocks in general also have a preference for holding mutual funds.
Some of the restrictive features of the specification in equation (3) are easy to generalize. We have estimated univariate specifications allowing for first-order autocorrelation in u jt , but found insignificant values of the autocorrelation coefficient for both assets. Adding interactions of the two lagged dependent variables or of lagged dependent variables with x t would make the model as flexible as a transition model with four different ownership states (both assets owned, stocks only, mutual funds only, neither of the two; the standard transition model would not include the random effects, however). We experimented with interaction terms, but found they were mostly insignificant and did not change the qualitative conclusions. The assumption that ␣ 1 and ␣ 2 are independent of the time-varying regressors can be relaxed by including linear combinations of the regressors in all time periods in the equation, in the spirit of Chamberlain (1984) . This substantially complicates the analysis, however, particularly due to the unbalanced nature of the panel. In specifications that include log financial wealth as a regressor, we will also include the sample average of log wealth. The robustness of our results to correlations between ␣ 1 and ␣ 2 and other regressors will be investigated using a linear probability model, discussed at the end of the next section.
A. Initial Conditions and Estimation
This subsection is an informal discussion of how to estimate the model; details can be found in Alessie et al. (2001) . In a short panel, there is a problem with the initial conditions (cf. Heckman, 1981a) . One way to deal with this problem is to add static (reduced-form) equations for the first time period similar to the dynamic equations, but without the lagged dependent variables. The coefficients are allowed to be different from the coefficients in the dynamic equations, the random effects are linear combinations of the random effects in the dynamic equations, and the error terms are allowed to have a different covariance structure. This is the straightforward generalization of the solution that was given by Heckman (1981b) for the univariate case. In principle, the static equations can be seen as linearized approximations of the true reduced form (obtained by recursively eliminating y tϪ1 until t ϭ Ϫϱ). Heckman's simulations suggest that the procedure already works well in short panels, that is, the approximation error does not lead to a large bias on the parameter estimates. 3 The complete model can then be estimated by maximum likelihood (ML), including the nuisance parameters of the static equations. Conditional on the random effects, the likelihood contribution of a given household can be written as a product of bivariate normal probabilities over all time periods. Each bivariate normal probability is then the probability of the observed ownership state, either conditional on the ownership state in the previous year (t Ն 2) or unconditional (t ϭ 1).
Since random effects are unobserved, the actual likelihood contribution is the expected value of the conditional likelihood contribution, with the expected value taken over the two individual effects. This is a two-dimensional integral. It can be approximated numerically using, for example, Gauss-Hermite quadrature. Instead, we use simulated ML: bivariate errors are drawn from N(0, I 2 ), they are transformed into draws of the random effects using the parameters of the random-effects distribution, the conditional likelihood contribution is computed for each draw, and the mean across R independent draws is computed. If R 3 ϱ with the number of observations, this gives a consistent estimator; if draws are independent across households and R 3 ϱ faster than ͌ N, then the estimator is asymptotically equivalent to exact ML [see Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994) , for example]. 4 In our case, the data at hand constitute an unbalanced panel, due to attrition, nonresponse, and refreshment. We assume that attrition and item nonresponse are random. We will use the complete unbalanced panel. This is more efficient than using the balanced subpanel only.
III. Data
We use six waves of the CentER Savings Survey (CSS), drawn from 1993 until 1998. Nyhus (1996) describes the setup of this data set and its general quality. The panel consists of two samples. The first (REP) is designed to be representative of the Dutch population, but, due to survey nonresponse, the actual REP samples are not completely representative. The REP contains approximately 2,000 households in each wave, including refreshment samples compensating for panel attrition. The second sample (HIP) was drawn from high-income areas and should represent the upper income decile. Initially, it consisted of about 900 families. It is available in each wave except the final one. For our analysis, REP and HIP are combined. In the descriptive statistics, we correct for nonrandom sampling by using sample weights that are based upon income and homeownership. These weights are constructed using information from a much larger data set [the Housing Needs Survey (WBO), collected by Statistics Netherlands], which is close to representative for the Dutch population.
The CSS data were collected via on-line terminal sessions, where each family was provided with a PC and modem. The answers to the survey questions provide general information on the household and its members, including work histories and labor market status, health status, and many types of income. Important for our purposes are the questions on assets and debts. For most of the forty asset and debt categories, respondents first indicate whether they own the type. If they do, they get a series of questions on amounts and the precise nature of each asset in that category. Nonresponse to the ownership questions is negligible, but nonresponse to some of the questions on the amounts is substantial. On average, about 20% of those who own stocks do not know or refuse to give the value of their stocks. Mutual funds have a lower nonresponse rate, around 13% per year. For some descriptive statistics (such as shares of specific asset types in total financial assets, see below), the item nonresponse creates a problem. We have therefore imputed the amounts for those who reported being owners but did not provide an amount. See Alessie et al. (2002) , who also provide an extensive description of all categories of assets and debts in the survey.
We focus on two types of risky financial assets: stocks and mutual funds. The CSS distinguishes between two types of stocks: stocks from substantial holding and (other) shares of private companies. There are very few people who hold the former type, but these people typically hold large amounts. The two types of stocks are different for tax purposes, since income from a substantial holding is treated as business capital. There is a large variety of mutual funds, composed of many different assets. In 1997, according to De Nederlandsche Bank (2001) , more than 50% of the total amount in mutual funds was invested in stocks, while about 30% was held in real estate and about 10% in bonds. The survey data that we use do not provide enough information to separate the mutual funds according to their type of investment. 5 During the period under consideration, dividends from other shares and from mutual funds were liable to income tax to the extent that they exceeded an exemption threshold (Dfl 2,000 for couples, Dfl 1,000 for singles). Capital gains on these are not taxed. The thresholds on dividends are separated from the thresholds on interest on savings, creating a tax incentive for holding stocks or mutual funds as well as saving accounts.
The first two columns of table 1 show how ownership rates of the two types of assets have developed during the years of the survey. The ownership rate of stocks has risen 4 In the application, we found R ϭ 100 to be sufficiently large in the sense that results did not change if R was increased further. 5 Note that the definition of mutual funds deviates from that adopted in Alessie et al. (2002) , where so-called growth funds are included. The latter are typically low-risk funds, which is why we exclude them here. from 11.4% to 15.4%. Mutual funds were more often held than stocks, with an even higher growth rate during the sample period. Many financial institutions have been successful in presenting mutual funds as a low-threshold asset, available to many individual investors. Still, the majority of Dutch households held neither stocks nor mutual funds in 1998. This lack of participation can be explained by monetary transaction costs and information costs, both of which can be substantial. 6 The remaining columns of table 1 show the time path of amounts invested in stocks and mutual funds, as shares of total financial assets. 7 Whereas the ownership rate of stocks is always lower than the ownership rate of mutual funds, the reverse is true for the shares of stocks and mutual funds in total financial wealth. This is because the few people who hold stocks typically hold large amounts of them. The growth of the shares is less spectacular than the growth of the ownership rates. The shares may be strongly influenced by some large amounts, due to the skewed distribution of wealth and its components. Some rich people hold large amounts, and there are very few of these in the sample, particularly in 1998, the year without a high-income panel. This may explain why some of the time patterns are not as pronounced as in aggregate data produced by Statistics Netherlands (see Alessie et al., 2002) . In the remainder of this study, we will not use the amounts data and focus on ownership.
In Figures 1 and 2 , we present (head of household) age and cohort patterns of the ownership rates of stocks and mutual funds, based upon the six waves of the survey. We use 5-year intervals to define year-of-birth cohorts, with birth years 1915-1919 for the oldest cohort, up to birth years 1970-1974 for the youngest cohort. Cohort labels indicate the middle year of birth. Each figure gives the raw ownership rates for all cohorts in all waves; the six points for each cohort represent the six average age levels at the times of the six interviews, and form a cohort curve. The jumps between the cohort curves show that, apart from age effects, there are also cohort or time effects. The cohort curves are not horizontal, implying that there are time and/or age effects; the fact that not all cohort curves are the same shows that there is more than just time effects. As usual, cohort, time, and age effects cannot be identified without further assumptions. A plausible interpretation of both figures, assuming that cohort effects are zero, is that ownership rates increase with age and that there are positive effects of calendar time, particularly for the older cohorts. Alessie et al. (2002) find a similar increasing age pattern for the category of all risky financial assets. This deviates from the pattern for some other countries. Italy and the United States, for example, have a hump-shaped pattern. Table 2 describes the dynamics of the ownership patterns of stocks and mutual funds separately. This gives a partial view of mobility, since only transitions of households that sell all their stocks or mutual funds or enter the market of stocks or mutual funds are shown, and not the changes in (positive) amounts held. The table presents the numbers of owners and nonowners of stocks and mutual funds in each balanced subsample and the percentages of exits and entries. 8 For example, 4.2% of households that did not own stocks in 1993 owned stocks in 1994. This is about 3.6% of all households in the 1993-1994 sample. On the other hand, 22.6% of those who owned stocks in 1993 (that is, 3.4% of all households in the sample) no longer owned stocks in 1994. Thus ownership mobility is substantial for stocks as well as mutual funds. In particular, the fractions of owners selling their mutual funds or stocks are larger than expected, 6 In the Netherlands, explicit transaction costs are low (about 0.5% of the investment), but implicit costs (entry and exit fees incorporated in the buying and selling price of the fund) are higher. The maximum entry fee is about 2.5% of the investment, and the maximum exit fee is about 1.5% (see Consumentenbond, 1999) . Apart from the transaction costs, most mutual funds charge a management fee of about 0.5% per year and apply minimum investment restrictions. These implicit costs are comparable to the substantial transaction costs in Italy discussed by Guiso and Jappelli (2002) . It is not clear, however, whether Dutch investors are aware of the implicit costs. 7 The share is defined as the total amount invested in the asset by all households (weighted with the sample weights), divided by the (weighted) total financial wealth of all households. 8 The sampling weights are not used. The transition rates hardly change if observations with very small amounts are excluded. given the high returns on these assets in the nineties. On average, 21.2% of all stock owners no longer owned stocks one year later, and 26.3% of mutual fund owners no longer owned mutual funds one year later. The large transition rates are of a similar order of magnitude to those reported for the United States and Italy. 9 In absolute numbers or as a percentage of total sample size, entry transitions are somewhat more numerous than exit transitions, in line with the rising ownership rates in table 1. Entry and exit numbers are larger for mutual funds than for individual stocks, which could reflect lower transaction costs for mutual funds. The balanced subpanel of households that participated in the survey for six consecutive years consists of 405 households. Of these, 297 never owned stocks, and 34 owned stocks in all six waves; 271 households never owned mutual funds, and 21 always owned mutual funds. In this subsample, there are 47 households that exit from stocks at least once, and 23 of these go back into stocks after they have exited; 76 exit from mutual funds at least once, and 35 of them go back into mutual funds after having exited.
Where did people go after exiting from stocks or mutual funds? Did stockholders leave the market completely, or did they become mutual fund holders? Averaging over all pairs of waves shows that of those who exited from stocks and did not own mutual funds, only 12.1% went into mutual funds. Of those who exited from mutual funds and did not own stocks, 14.1% went into stocks. Complete substitution of stocks for mutual funds or vice versa is thus not very common; most people who sell their only type of risky financial assets leave the market completely. Table 3 shows the correlation between holding one asset type in one period and holding the other asset type in the next period. For all years, the ownership rate of stocks in year t ϩ 1 is larger for those with mutual funds in year t than for those without mutual funds in year t-conditional on not owning stocks in year t. For example, 9.4% of those without stocks and with mutual funds in 1993 owned stocks in 1994. On the other hand, only 3.5% of those who had neither stocks nor mutual funds in 1993 owned stocks in 1994. Thus there is some positive correlation across ownership of the two asset types. The same conclusion is obtained when ownership rates of mutual funds are consid- [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] , and report transition rates of 10% from ownership to nonownership and 19% from nonownership to ownership. Miniaci and Ruberti (2001) report 2-year transition rates from ownership to nonownership between 32% and 42%, using the SHIW survey of the Bank of Italy. ered. Whether this positive correlation reflects some genuine state dependence effect (such as learning) or (observed or unobserved) heterogeneity is one of the issues we will analyze in the next section, using the models in section II.
IV. Results
The results of the random-effects probit model are discussed in the first subsection. In the second subsection, these results are briefly compared with those of a fixed-effects linear probability model. In the final subsection, the implications of the probit results for explaining the growth in ownership rates of stocks and mutual funds are presented. This is based on predicted probabilities and will be done on the basis of the probit results only, because predicted probabilities in the linear probability models are not always between 0 and 1. Tables 4 and 5 give the results for four specifications of the bivariate probit model. For stocks and mutual funds, the same explanatory variables are used. Financial wealth is not included in the first two specifications, because it may not be strictly exogenous. In the final two specifications, lagged Reference groups for dummy variable groups are: low education; paid employee; high risk aversion. Estimates of the initial conditions equations are available upon request from shochguertel@feweb.vu.nl. The predicted probabilities are ownership rates (in %) obtained from the model for an average household: exogenous variables are set to their weighted sample means, random effects are set to 0, and the lagged ownership dummies are set to 0 or 1. log financial wealth and its own household-specific average (over the observation window) are included. This controls for the potential correlation between lagged financial wealth and the individual effects [see Hausman and Taylor (1981) , for example]. 10 We find a very strong positive relation between the average log financial wealth and ownership of stocks as well as mutual funds. The effect of log financial wealth in the previous year is much smaller and, surprisingly, negative. It is significant at the 5% level for stocks and at the 10% level for mutual funds. Probably the relation between asset ownership and financial wealth requires more structure than is incorporated in the current model, and it is beyond the scope of this paper. The main reason for presenting results including financial wealth is to check 10 Including an arbitrary linear combination as in Hyslop (1999) is impossible due to the unbalanced nature of the panel. whether or not estimates of other effects are sensitive to its inclusion. In specifications 2 and 4, an indicator for risk aversion is included. This is the answer on a scale from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 7 ("agree strongly") to the question whether the head of household agrees with the statement "I think it is more important to have safe investments and guaranteed returns than to take a risk to have a chance to get the highest possible returns." This question was posed only to respondents with household income of Dfl 20,000 or more, thus excluding 15.6% of all households. Moreover, 4.8% of all households in the sample answered "don't know." As expected, the probability of owning stocks falls with increasing degree of risk aversion. Such a relation is not found, however, for mutual funds. In specification 2, those who answer "don't know" or do not get the question have a smaller tendency to own mutual funds. In specification 4, where financial wealth is also controlled for, the risk aversion dummies are jointly insignificant in the mutual funds ownership equation.
A. Random-Effects Probit
To avoid correlation with random effects, endogeneity of income, and the marginal tax rate, income is noncapital income and the marginal tax rate is the maximum of the within-household imputed marginal rate applied to pseudotaxable income, in which individual capital income is replaced by its cross-sectional average (following Agell & Edin, 1990) . The effects of income and the marginal tax rate are hard to disentangle, due to the strong (positive) correlation between these variables. We find that both effects are positive for both types of assets. For stocks, the income effect is significant (at the two-sided 5% level); for mutual funds, the tax effect is significant. An explanation for the stronger income effect for stocks than for mutual funds may be that high-income households will typically have more to invest, making the fixed costs of buying or holding individual stocks less important. Moreover, the sheer size of the portfolios of the higher income groups may be bigger relative to the unit prices of stocks, thus allowing them to hold a bigger variety of stocks and to achieve greater diversification than low income groups. This argument does not apply to mutual funds, where holders can achieve diversification with small investment amounts. King and Leape (1998) find that the marginal tax rate has a statistically significantly positive effect on ownership of corporate equity but conclude that taxes play a rather limited role in explaining differences in portfolio composition across households, especially when it comes to stock ownership.
The income tax rules for stocks and mutual funds are the same (see section III). The fact that capital gains are not taxed creates an incentive to hold stocks or mutual funds, which increases with the household's marginal tax rate. 11 This explains the positive effect of the marginal tax rate. The larger tax effect for mutual funds could be due to the fact that suppliers of these funds strongly advertise their tax-favored nature.
Labor market status variables for the head of household are jointly significant in both equations. The retired are significantly more likely to own stocks or mutual funds than employees. The reason might be that income risk from pensions is lower than from earnings, and that the willingness to invest in risky assets falls with increasing background risk (cf., for example, Hochguertel, 2003) .
The most striking result is the enormous effect of selfemployment on ownership of stocks: a self-employed head has a more than 25 percentage point higher probability of owning stocks than an employee (the reference group), ceteris paribus. The effect remains almost the same if controls for financial wealth or risk aversion are included. This result is consistent with Heaton and Lucas (2000) , who find that people with private business holdings in the United States hold a disproportionately large share of common stocks, but is at odds with findings of Bertaut and StarrMcCluer (2002) for the United States and of Eymann and Boersch-Supan (2002) for Germany, who find that the self-employed are less likely to hold risky financial assets than employees. Part of the explanation could be that the self-employed often hold shares in their own firm, which will often be shares from a substantial holding. Excluding stocks from substantial holdings from our analysis reduces the size of the effect by approximately half, though it remains strong and significant.
Because figures 1 and 2 in the previous section have a plausible interpretation without cohort effects, we have included age and time effects but no cohort effects. This identifies the age and time patterns. Age is significantly positive for stocks as well as mutual funds, in line with findings for risky asset ownership by King and Leape (1987) , who attribute the age effect to the accumulation of information about investment opportunities. This information argument seems particularly relevant for individual stocks, which are the more information-intensive type of risky assets. The time effects are similar for the two asset types and show that the assets became more popular during the last few years of the survey.
The education coefficients indicate that the higher educated significantly more often hold stocks but not mutual funds. Again, this could be attributed to the greater information processing requirements for investing in stocks relative to mutual funds where investments are made by professionals. If financial wealth is included, however, the effects of education vanish (see table 5 ), implying that the education effects in table 4 might pick up wealth effects. This finding is quite unusual in the literature (but see, for example, Guiso & Jappelli, 2002, and Bertaut & StarrMcCluer, 2002) . A similar interpretation can be given for the dummy "high-income panel." The positive significant effect of this dummy for both asset types largely vanishes if financial wealth is included (table 5). The way the high-income sample is drawn and the general tendency of the income-rich to save a lot make it plausible that selection into this panel is based not only on income but also on wealth, explaining why the dummy variable serves as a wealth proxy.
The estimated standard deviations of the random effects are 1.44 and 1.20 for stocks and mutual funds, respectively. The standard deviations of the error terms are normalized to 1. Thus, unobserved heterogeneity plays a major role, explaining more than half of the unsystematic variation in the model.
In both equations, the lagged dependent variables concerning ownership of the same asset type are significantly positive. To interpret these results, predicted ownership probabilities for the various lagged ownership states are presented in the final panels of tables 4 and 5. Exogenous variables are set to their (weighted) sample means, and random effects are set to 0. According to specification 1, owners of stocks are about 16.7 percentage points more likely to own stocks next period than nonowners with the same (observed and unobserved) characteristics if they do not own mutual funds, and 15.4 percentage points if they do. For mutual funds, the differences are even larger (20.1 percentage points if no stocks are held, 17.4 percentage points if stocks are held). Similar differences are found for the other specifications. Explanations for this positive state dependence are the costs of acquiring stocks or mutual funds (that is, genuine transaction costs, not the costs of holding the assets) 12 and asset-specific learning: once people own the asset, they are more familiar with it, and are more aware of its risk and return characteristics.
All the results discussed so far relate to the dynamics of each of the two types of assets separately. In most respects, these results are similar to what would be predicted by separate univariate models. The bivariate model, however, also gives insight into the relation between the two ownership decisions.
The cross-effects of lagged ownership of one asset type on ownership of the other asset type are both negative, and one of them is significant at the 5% level: ceteris paribus, those who do not own stocks are significantly more likely to own mutual funds in the next period than those who own stocks. According to specification 1 in table 4, the differences are 4.4 percentage points and 2.9 percentage points for those who did and did not own mutual funds in the previous period. If financial wealth is controlled for (specification 3 in table 5), the other cross-effect becomes significantly negative also. If the risk aversion index is included (specifications 2 and 4), the negative signs remain, but the effects are no longer significant.
The negative cross-effects cannot be explained by general learning: if ownership of one asset type improved knowledge about the other asset type, a positive cross-effect would result. Thus the results on the own effects and cross-effects together suggest that if learning takes place, it is specific for the type of asset.
On the other hand, negative cross-effects are also consistent with the adjustment cost arguments that explained the strong positive effects of lagged ownership of the same asset type. People who own stocks but no mutual funds have an incentive to remain focused on stocks to avoid the adjustment costs, whereas people who own neither stocks nor mutual funds and who consider investing in risky assets face adjustment costs anyhow. Adjustment costs thus give an explanation for own as well as cross state dependence effects, whereas learning can only explain the univariate effects. These adjustment costs may reflect the actual (monetary) transaction costs involved with buying or selling an asset, but may also include nonmonetary components such as the required effort and the need to collect information. Sticking to one type of assets may also be due to the realization that too much churning does not pay and that portfolio choice should be governed by a long horizon.
The estimated correlation coefficient between the two random effects is significantly positive, ranging from 0.42 in specification 4 to 0.66 in specification 1. This suggests that the people who have a large preference for holding stocks (given their observed characteristics) tend to be the same people who have a preference for holding mutual funds. These may be the people with lower degrees of risk aversion or greater interest in financial markets. The positive correlation between holding stocks and holding mutual funds in the data is to a large extent due to this positive correlation in unobserved heterogeneity.
Allowing for correlation in the individual effects in the two equations has a major effect on the estimates of the cross-effects of ownership of one type of asset on ownership of the other type of asset in the next time period. If we estimate the model with the correlation between the random effects restricted to 0, we find significant positive estimates for both cross-effects. Not allowing for correlation between unobserved heterogeneity terms would thus lead to a large upwards bias on the effect of ownership of one asset type on ownership of the other type and to misleading conclusions about the importance of general learning.
The correlation between the error terms in the two equations is small and insignificant. A negative correlation could point to fixed holding costs for each asset type (such as monitoring costs) that would be an incentive for specialization. Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) finds evidence of such costs. A positive correlation could point to a common element in monitoring both assets, or at benefits of diversification. Apparently, the positive and the negative effects cancel or do not play a role.
B. Linear Probability Model
To check the sensitivity of the main conclusions to the random-effects assumption, some standard linear dynamic panel data models were estimated. See, for example, Verbeek (2000, Section 10.4) for an accessible exposition, and Hyslop (1999) for a comparison of univariate linear probability and random-effects models. The following assumptions are the basis for GMM estimation:
1. The time-varying independent variables are uncorrelated with the error terms (strict exogeneity) but can be correlated with the individual effects. 2. Time-invariant independent variables included in the model are uncorrelated with the error terms as well as the individual effects. 13,14 3. The error terms are uncorrelated over time.
To avoid the well-known problem that the small sample performance of GMM deteriorates with too many moments, only the moments combining regressors and error terms that are as close as possible in time are used. Standard GMM estimation is applied, separately for the equations for stocks and mutual funds. Any type of heteroskedasticity is allowed for, including that implied by the binary nature of the dependent variable.
We ran several specifications with different sets of independent variables. 15 On the basis of Sargan tests for the overidentifying restrictions, we selected the specification presented in table 6. For stocks, the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected at the 2% level, although they are rejected at the 5% level. For mutual funds, the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected at any conventional significance level. Moreover, the hypothesis of no secondorder autocorrelation in the residuals of the differenced equations is not rejected for either type of assets, supporting the assumption of no autocorrelation in the error terms.
The same explanatory variables are used as in the probit model in tables 4 and 5. The results are largely in line with the probit results. For example, the large effect of selfemployment on the probability of holding stocks is again the most salient finding. We can now conclude that this is not an individual effect, because correlation between individual effects and regressors is controlled for.
The main difference from specification 1 in table 4 is the estimated cross-effect of lagged ownership of stocks on ownership of mutual funds, which is now positive and insignificant, whereas it was negative and significant in the random-effects probit model. This confirms that no evidence of general learning is found, but does not support the adjustment costs argument given in the previous subsection.
The main purpose of the linear probability models is to perform a sensitivity check on the findings on the basis of the probit models. The specification in table 6, as well as estimates of alternative specifications, confirms that most findings are very similar (tax and income effects, effect of labor market position, effects of lagged ownership of an asset type on the same asset type). The only differences concern the cross-effects of lagged ownership of stocks on ownership of mutual funds and of lagged ownership of mutual funds on ownership of stocks. Still, we typically find significant negative effects or insignificant effects, and only find significant positive effects if a zero correlation of unobserved heterogeneity terms for the two equations is imposed-a restriction that is always fiercely rejected in favor of positive correlation. This confirms that crosseffects due to general learning cannot be established and points at asset-specific learning and adjustment costs.
C. Explaining the Growth in Ownership Rates
The probit model results presented in table 4 can be used to predict ownership probabilities for individual households and aggregate ownership rates for groups of households under different scenarios. Such predictions can be used to analyze how much the explanatory variables in the equations contribute to the changes in the aggregate ownership rates of stocks and mutual funds over time. The idea is similar to the Oaxaca decomposition that is commonly used in studies on wage differentials (Oaxaca, 1973) . The results for specification 1 are presented in table 7. The top panel refers to stocks, the bottom panel to mutual funds. The first row of each panel presents observed changes in mean predicted ownership rates (in percentage points), using common samples for the two years considered. Random effects are set to 0. Since time dummies for all years are included, these sample changes reflect the increasing trend in aggregate ownership rates over the same years reasonably well. 16 The other rows compare two sets of predicted aggregate ownership rates: those using the observed explanatory variables and those in which one or more explanatory variables are replaced by their lags. Take, for example, the change in the stock ownership rate from 1997 to 1998, approximately 3.48 percentage points. If in the 1998 sample age is replaced by its lagged value (that is, age in 1997), the predicted mean ownership rate falls by 0.26 percentage point. In other words, age changes explain 0.26 percentage point of the total 3.48 percentage points. Similarly, changes in incomes and marginal tax rates (which become somewhat larger, on average) explain a 0.20 percentage point rise of the ownership rate. All exogenous regressors (not including time dummies or lagged dependent variables) explain a rise of about 0.44 percentage point. The lagged dependent variables explain a rise of 0.11 percentage point, mainly due to the rise in the ownership rate of stocks from 1996 to 1997. In total the regressors in the model (time dummies not included) explain 0.55 percentage point of the 3.48 percentage point rise in ownership of stocks. The remainder is not explained by the regressors and is captured by the time dummies, whose contribution can be seen as the (residual) part of the change in ownership that cannot be explained by the economic variables in the model. 17 The results for mutual funds are similar. The conclusion is that age is the only exogenous variable which consistently contributes positively to explaining the rising ownership rates. The main reason is that age is not only significant in the probits, but also systematically increases over time. Self-employment, for example, is very important for ownership of stocks, but the fraction of self-employed in the sample does not vary systematically over the years.
For the other specifications, the regressors explain a similarly small part of the total rise in the ownership rates. According to specification 4, the fall in average risk aver- (1) and (2), with random effects set to 0; presented are the differences in such means between the baseline case and the case where some regressors are lagged: "Total change": all right-side variables are lagged, including ownership dummies and time dummies; "All x's": all regressors except time dummies and lagged ownership dummies are lagged. sion explains 0.29 percentage point and 0.48 percentage point of the rise in ownership of stocks in 1996-1997 and 1997-1998 , but still, all the economic variables together explain only a small part of the total rise. This may mean that most of the increase was induced by supply factors such as the development of the mutual fund industry or aggressive advertising of financial services, rather than by changes in household circumstances.
V. Conclusions
As the stockholder base has widened considerably over the last decade in many countries, understanding how households make their portfolio decisions over time has wide-ranging implications for understanding the allocation of risk in financial markets, the distribution of wealth, and pricing relationships for individual assets. This paper is one of the first studies of the dynamics of individual households' (multivariate) investment strategies using representative panel survey data.
We have estimated dynamic models explaining ownership of the two main types of risky financial assets in the Netherlands-stocks and mutual funds-that differ in degree of riskiness, information intensiveness, and adjustment costs. Mutual funds are particularly attractive for small investors with little financial knowledge, as they are managed by professionals. Our results confirm this to some extent, in that we find that the probability of owning stocks increases significantly with income whereas the probability of owning mutual funds does not. Tax incentives, on the other hand, play a larger role for mutual funds than for stocks. The self-employed are much more likely to hold stocks than others, but they do not have a different ownership rate of mutual funds. Explanations could be that the self-employed are interested in specific stocks to hedge against their larger income uncertainty, or that acquiring knowledge about specific firms and their prospects is closer to their everyday practice. The alternative explanation, that the self-employed simply have different preferences and care less about diversification, is unlikely in that the effect remains the same if a subjective index for risk aversion is included or if unobserved (preference) heterogeneity is allowed to be correlated with background variables in a fixed-effects setting.
We find that the dynamics of ownership of either type of risky assets are driven by state dependence as well as unobserved heterogeneity. Each of these explains part of the persistence of ownership of both types of assets in the data. The state dependence can be explained as arising from the adjustment costs of buying or selling the asset or from asset-type-specific learning. On the other hand, the positive sample correlation between ownership of one type of asset and lagged ownership of the other asset is explained as arising from (observed and unobserved) heterogeneity only. One source of this could be a joint element in monitoring or other holding costs that makes it attractive to hold both asset types simultaneously. Another reason could be that combining stocks and mutual funds creates opportunities for diversification that cannot be attained by mutual funds alone (since these typically invest in certain subsamples of stocks).
If correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity in the two ownership equations is not allowed, a positive effect of owning one type of asset on owning the other type in the next year is found. This changes completely, however, once the two unobserved heterogeneity terms are allowed to be correlated. We then find a positive correlation and no evidence that households substitute one type of assets for the other, or that ownership of one type leads to general learning, more financial knowledge, and a larger probability of buying the other type of assets. In contrast, we find some evidence of a negative effect of owning one type of assets on buying or keeping the other type. This can be explained by adjustment costs, implying that those who have acquired one specific asset will tend not to reallocate their money to the other type of assets. Such adjustment costs will include the actual transaction costs involved with portfolio adjustment, but may also contain nonmonetary or perceived cost components, reflecting effort, the cost of acquiring information, and the like.
In their introduction, Guiso et al. (2002) report that, conditional upon ownership, the age profile of asset shares is nearly flat in most countries. This finding indicates that people do not rebalance their wealth portfolio very frequently. Guiso et al. (2002) point out that this portfolio inertia cannot be justified by (standard) analytical or computational portfolio models. Analytical models stress the role of the length of horizon for optimal choice of portfolio composition (see Gollier, 2002) . More complicated simulation models similarly imply policy functions for portfolio shares that are sensitive to age (see Haliassos and Michaelides, 2002) . Moreover, professional financial advisors encourage their clients to reduce the share of risky assets as they age. Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) also find that households choose a particular portfolio of assets and do not make many changes even when their circumstances change and in spite of professional advice. Similarly, Poterba (2002) finds that households fail to rebalance their portfolios to take full advantage of (changes in) tax provisions.
Classic papers like those of Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) assume that agents live in a frictionless world and have HARA preferences. They predict myopic optimal behavior (that is, a constant fraction of risky assets in the portfolio) for each individual. To make such models more realistic, it would be useful to introduce dynamic features. Our results suggest that asset-specific learning experiences and real or perceived adjustment costs are particularly relevant. These can explain why households, once they have decided which asset classes to participate in, are not likely to revisit this decision.
OWNERSHIP OF STOCKS AND MUTUAL FUNDS
Future research can go in several directions. First, we have not modeled the amounts held. Although this is not without measurement problems, it certainly seems a relevant extension. It could also help analyze the importance of fixed costs of holding, buying, and selling assets, extending the work of Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) . Second, if data for a longer time period become available, it seems useful to relate the ownership dynamics to the trends in the financial markets or to relevant macro variables such as unemployment, inflation or expected inflation, and consumer confidence. Third, straightforward extensions of our models could be used to analyze other asset and debt types, or to analyze assets at a less aggregate level. For example, to understand the dynamics and in particular the underlying cost structure driving these, it seems relevant to distinguish people who substitute one stock for another from people who do not trade at all.
Finally, it would be interesting to extend the analysis with data on the recent time period with falling asset returns. The rationale for people then not venturing into risky assets seems to be that the return forgone is too low compared to the costs saved. In times when returns are high (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) , this may make sense, and the time dummies in our models seem to pick up the sluggishness in the adjustment. On the other hand, there is some asymmetry in that once adjustment costs are incurred, part of them will be sunk (at least the information acquisition costs). Selling the assets will therefore not be associated with the same costs. Such an analysis will have to await future data releases covering the recent period of downturn.
